What Nixon Has Yet To Accept in "Sufficiency" P. 2

A Pity The Joint Chiefs of Staff Won't Apply The Same Humane Heresy in Vietnam

"I saw no point in senselessly sending people to their deaths."

—Commander Lloyd M. Bucher before the Naval Court of Inquiry in the Pueblo affair.

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Why The Casualties Rise As The Peace Talks Go On

President Nixon's dismissal of a cease-fire in Vietnam calls for close examination. It was sophistry to say that a cease-fire "may be meaningless" in a guerilla war because of the difficulty in controlling it. Whatever element of truth this may contain as a general proposition, the history of past truces in the 9-year old Vietnam war shows that the other side has had little difficulty in enforcing a cease-fire on its own troops. Cease-fires have been broken by the other side on any meaningful scale only when they wanted to break it, as in the Tet offensive last year, or in defensive response to the aggressive patrolling which has been our military's own way of getting around cease-fire orders in holiday truces. Until the bombing pause the U. S. official line was to call for a cease-fire as the price of a bombing halt. The line has changed because we hope to exploit the present situation by "clean up" operations against the guerillas in the South. That is why casualties still rise as the peace talks go on.

Political Censorship at the Pentagon

A neat bit of censorship is helping to hide the truth. The Pentagon gives out figures on attacks initiated from our side but the figures on enemy-initiated attacks are "classified", an antiseptic word for censored. One of these censored figures came to light last December 14 when the *New York Times* in an editorial, "Endangering the Peace Talks", said "Since the bombing halt, the enemy has initiated only one battalion-sized assault. By comparison last month American troops mounted 63 battalion operations and South Vietnam staged 664 such campaigns." It said the purpose was "to extend South Vietnamese Government control over disputed areas and territory long controlled by the Vietcong" and warned that such an effort "to upset the balance in Vietnam in advance of a settlement in Paris is bound to produce a reaction sooner or later" and risk a flareup "that could wreck the chance for a negotiated peace."

In the wake of the Nixon press conference, we went over to the Pentagon to check the *Times* figures and bring them up to date. We found the tempo of offensive operations from our side had gone up about 25% in December over November. The figures on battalion-sized operations from our side in December were 824 South Vietnamese, 84 U.S. and 48 combined, or a total of 956 as against the 727 figure the *Times* gave for November. But when we asked for the figures on enemy-initiated actions of battalion size, we were told that all the figures on enemy-initiated actions were in classified tables. We went to two different sources and finally put in a formal question on why such figures were classified, but we're still waiting for an answer. The *New York Times* assertion was not challenged. One officer explained that any paper with a man in Saigon who kept a sharp eye on the daily communiques could get figures on enemy-initiated attacks. Obviously the totals on enemy attacks do not keep any information from the enemy he does not already know. This is political not military censorship, designed not to confuse the enemy but to hide what is going on from the American public. We hope some members of Congress will insist that these figures be released.

The course in Vietnam becomes clearer if one compares it with U Thant's original 3-point plan for peace. At his press conference January 28 the Secretary General noted that two of the points had been put into effect — the bombing of the North had ended and talks among all the parties involved had begun. U Thant's third point was a gradual de-escalation of the fighting. Instead of de-escalating in response to the considerable de-escalation on the other side, we have been stepping up both ground and aerial action in the South, as we have the bombings over Laos.

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Quite A Change In Emphasis

"I am becoming inordinately impatient with the continued deaths of American boys in Vietnam. I would like to get going at the Paris peace conference. I would like to get started on these plans to lower the level of combat. This isn't difficult to do. I would like to start getting our troops out of there. I would like to see a cease-fire."

—Defense Secretary Clifford: Face The Nation Dec. 15

Q. Mr. President, do you consider it possible to have a cease-fire in Vietnam so long as the Viet Cong still occupy Vietnamese territory?

A. I think that it is not helpful in discussing Vietnam to use such terms as "cease-fire", because cease fire is a term of art that really has no relevance, in my opinion, to a guerilla war.

—Nixon's first press conference January 28

"President Nixon has endeared himself to South Vietnam's leaders by noting in his first press conference the irrelevance of a paper 'cease-fire' to the realities of the Vietnam conflict . . . Just as a bombing halt was anathema to Saigon officials three months ago, so a cease-fire frightens them today."

—Special from Saigon to the Washington Star *Jan. 29*

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Escalation In The South Has Cost 2,000 American Lives Since Nov. 1

(Continued From Page One)

Tacitly or explicitly, it is now becoming clearer, Johnson exacted a sharp price when he ended the bombing of the North. He imposed severe restrictions on enemy activity while making it possible for us to increase ours. The Nixon administration is carrying on the strategy of Johnson's. This strategy has two elements. The first is to threaten resumption of the bombing in the North if the other side should resume substantial forays or shellings from the DMZ or should attack the larger cities. The second is to take advantage of these military limitations on the other side to move considerable forces from the northern part of South Vietnam where they had been on guard against a possible invasion from the DMZ. These forces have been moved south, for "pacification" operations in the Mekong Delta. This has been a guerilla stronghold since the earliest days of the uprising against the French. The aim is to reconquer the Delta for the Saigon regime.

The Semantics of Accelerated War

The bombing of the North ended Nov. 1. The escalation from our side began at the same time. In the three months since more than 2,000 Americans have lost their lives. White House orders explain the rising casualty lists. Clark Clifford lifted the curtain on them last November 24 when he said "General Abrams has specific instructions to maintain constant and intensive pressure on the enemy." The fight-and-talk strategy was ours. Our Madison Avenue-minded military invented a new soap ad phrase to sell this accelerated warfare. They renamed it "accelerated pacification." Clifford added loyally that this was "the right psychology and the right strategy to follow now," but he expressed the hope that when "we begin to make progress in Paris" and agreement "in certain areas" was reached "then instruction could be given by Hanoi to their battlefield commanders, and instruction could be given here by President Johnson to General Abrams to withdraw from contacts with enemy forces." The enemy began withdrawing from contact and trying to evade battle months ago. But there has been no de-escalation on our side. Three weeks later on *Face the Nation,* Clifford (see p. 1 box) declared himself "inordinately impatient with the continued deaths of American boys in Vietnam" and urged a cease-fire. Neither Johnson nor Nixon seem to share this impatience. Nixon can cut the casualties any time he orders de-escalation and a defensive strategy, as proposed by Senator McGovern in

When and How "Sufficiency" Made Its Debut

What has escaped general notice is that the term "sufficiency" was first used during the Eisenhower administration to fight off a Democratic scare campaign about a "bomber gap" and later a "missile gap" just like the "security gap" campaign against the Democrats last year by Nixon and Laird. The man who first used the term "sufficiency" was Donald A. Quarles, Ike's Air Force Secretary. He was reviled for it by the Air Force lobby. As late as April 24, 1959, Joe Alsop in a bitter column called him "Mr. Missile Gap." What Quarles said more than a decade ago applies with equal force today. "There comes a time in the course of increasing our airpower," Quarles had the nerve to tell the Air Force Association Aug. 4, 1956, "when we must make a determination of sufficiency . . . There is no occasion in this audience to labor the point that the buildup of atomic power in the hands of the two opposed alliances of nations makes total war an unthinkable catastrophe for both sides. Neither side can hope by a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery of atomic weapons to escape catastrophe . . . even if there is a wide disparity between the offensive or defensive strengths of the opposing forces." In another speech on Sept. 26 the same year, he said we could "produce more weapons than the entire Communist coalition" but that this "might well undermine the very social and industrial foundations upon which our strength is based." In an earlier speech that year, on Feb. 25, Quarles even saw in the "balance of terror" between the nuclear powers "the ray of hope that we may have a period of enforced peace in which differences may be adjusted and tensions relaxed." There is as yet little sign that Nixon or Laird is prepared to adopt not only the Quarles term but its underlying philosophy.

Not A Security Gap But The Danger Of A New Spurt in the Nuclear Arms Race

Q. During the Presidential campaign President Nixon charged that the Democrats had allowed a security gap to open. Do his comments at the press conference about sufficiency imply that there is no security gap?

A. No. I believe the President's earlier comments were borne out very factually in the posture statement that was delivered by Clark Clifford to Congress.

—Defense Secretary Laird at press conference Jan. 30.

"It is reasonable to conclude that even if the Soviets attempt to match us in numbers of strategic missiles we shall continue to have, as far into the future as we can now discern, a very substantial qualitative lead and a distinct superiority in the numbers of deliverable weapons and the overall combat effectiveness of our strategic offensive forces. But even so we should have no illusions that superiority alone will guarantee our safety."

—p. 46 Clifford's final "posture" statement, after noting (p. 42) that the U.S. has 4200 deliverable nuclear warheads against 1200 for the USSR, or 10 times as many as the 400 which McNamara testified last year were sufficient to impose "unacceptable" damage on the Soviet Union, i.e. to cripple it as a viable society.

Clifford declared it "distinctly hopeful" that the Soviets want negotiations on missiles. Clifford said this recognized "that increased security cannot be found simply in the procurement of additional strategic weapons — which may mean instead merely another upward spiral of the arms race, the economic costs which such a spiral implies and a net reduction in safety for all mankind." (p. 3) He warned (p. 49) that "We stand on the eve of a new round in the armaments race with the Soviet Union, a race which will contribute nothing to the real security of either side."

In our (ultimately successful) search for a copy of Clifford's report, we discovered that it had not been formally submitted to the House Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon and that the Committee was not planning to incorporate it in this year's "posture" hearings. A committee aide told us loftily, "Clifford has a right to his personal opinion." Neither the Pentagon nor the Committee likes appeals for arms limitation.

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Nixon Can Cut The Casualties Anytime By Ordering De-Escalation

a speech Feb. 3 to Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

The premise of negotiations is that neither side can win a military victory. If we are negotiating, why go on killing? If we hope to achieve our aims in South Vietnam by a stepup in the killing, why negotiate? The cynical answer is that the negotiations serve as a smokescreen. Neither the U. S. military nor the Saigon regime ever wanted to negotiate. The Paris talks for them only make it easier to continue the war. There is a steady flow of optimistic stories from Saigon on how well the war is now going. One by Charles Mohr in the *New York Times* Jan. 3 put its finger on a crucial, though non-military factor. "One important factor on which present optimism is based," Mohr wrote, "is the hope that a decision to continue to prosecute the war can be reconciled with the domestic American desire 'to ease the pain' ".

Realities Few Notice

Few notice the realities reflected in the last AP weekly casualty report from Saigon (*Washington Post,* Jan. 31). The report covered the week ended Jan. 18 (196 U. S. dead and 1277 wounded) and the week ended Jan. 25 (190 U. S. dead and 1224 wounded). Why are casualties still so heavy? The AP explained that while "there has been no sustained large-scale fighting since last Fall . . . thousands of U. S. and government troops carry out daily operations in search of the elusive enemy." It added that "pushes are also being made into areas long held by the Vietcong, and in these, even when no opposition is encountered, there are casualties from mines and booby traps." How long can these offensive operations go on without a counter-offensive from the other side? As we write, for the first time in three months, there have been three battalion size enemy attacks in the past few days. It is time to make the U. S. public aware of all this before fighting flares up again in full fury.

It is nonsense to say that you cannot have a cease-fire in Vietnam. Fighting ended in the first Vietnamese war when a cease-fire was negotiated at Geneva in 1954. Then it was part of the general settlement. The question is one of policy, not feasibility. The Viet Cong and Hanoi oppose a cease-fire until there has been a political settlement. The U. S. and Saigon don't want a cease-fire until there has been a military "settlement". They cling to the old hope that the war will end with the enemy "fading away", a favorite phrase of Henry Cabot Lodge whom Nixon resuscitated to be his chief negotiator at Paris. The U. S. military seem to be making their plans on the assumption that there will be no settlement

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The Price We Pay For The Price We Impose

"It would be a mistake to believe that by spending enough on arms the U. S. can force the Soviet Union to accept second class status simply because of its smaller economic and industrial capacity. Long before that point is reached America's own growth will have been stunted and its society badly distorted by the military demands placed on it.

"The effect of the arms race on Soviet decision-making must also be considered. A rapid growth rate and increased consumption and consumer influence in the Soviet Union are almost certainly in the long-term U.S. interest. Conversely, the greater the Soviet defense budget, the stronger will be the hand and the longer the tenure of those elements in Moscow most inimical to the United States.

'Thus, increased allocation of Soviet resources to the arms race is triply disadvantageous: in increasing the threat to the United States; in requiring that the country devote its own resources to responding; and in delaying changes in Soviet society which are the long-term hope for a more stable, peaceful world."

—Geo. W. Rathjens: The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), a point worth remembering when Nixon links political conditions to arms talks.

Inside The Arms Gravy Train: The Poorer The Weapons The Higher The Profits

Thanks to the enterprise of Washington Post reporter Bernard D. Nossiter what he terms "the first systematic effort to measure how well or ill the Pentagon's expensive weapons perform" has been made public. His story on the report January 26 led to its release by the Budget Bureau four days later and an attempt by Secretary Laird at press conference Jan. 30 to disparage it as just a "graduate thesis", a description he repeated 8 times in one form or another.

But Richard A. Stubbing, author of "Improving the Acquisition Process for High Risk Electronics Systems," is no ordinary graduate student. He spent four years as a cost engineer at Eastman Kodak after Harvard Business School. Since 1962 he has been a Budget Bureau missile and aircraft examiner. In the academic year 1967-68, with other outstanding career officials, he was selected to attend Princeton's Woodrow Wilson school, where he wrote this paper based on his experience. A version naming names was classified.

The report covers 13 major aircraft and missile programs since 1955 without identifying them. They cost a total of $40 billion. Only four, costing $5 billion, could be relied upon to perform at more than 75% of specifications, and "less than 40% of the effort produced systems with acceptable electronic performance." Two of them (the B-70 and the Skybolt missile) were scrapped after an outlay of $2 billion.

The rewards of inefficiency were high. Aerospace industry, "with a high wage structure and a reputation for inefficiency", earns "a 12% greater return on equity than the average of all U.S. industrial firms." To relate performance to profits, the report studied two leading arms contractors. X (identified by Nossiter as North American) earned profits 40% higher than the aerospace average with 98% of its business government in the 10 years 1957-67. Its score on six military programs was 1 successful, 1 cancelled, and four that broke down four times as frequently as promised.

Contractor Y (identified by Nossiter as General Dynamics) also netted better than the aerospace industry average. None of the seven weapons systems it built measured up to expectations. Among them was the notorious TFX, now known as the F-111. Laird in a phone call to Nossiter after the press conference said publication of such data might weaken U. S. negotiators in arms talks. To paraphrase a famous remark by an English General about his own troops, these weapons may not scare the enemy but they certainly should scare us.

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A Provisional Government and Free Elections As The Road To Peace

(Continued From Page Three)

in Paris. They plan a prolonged American occupation, though on a reduced scale. "From those most deeply involved in overall strategy" in Saigon and Washington, *U. S. News & World Report* Jan. 27 reported that our military foresee a slow reduction of U. S. forces in Vietnam to 200,000 men by the end of 1971. They set that level as "the basis for a long-haul, low-cost effort in Vietnam that could continue indefinitely." On such a scale "low cost" could still mean $5 or $6 billion. The military men *U. S. News* interviewed regard Korea as a precedent. There we still have 50,000 men 15 years after the shooting stopped. We also have no peace treaty, a continued trickle of casualties and the ever present danger that the war may break out again at any time. That is not a comforting precedent.

Cease-Fire Agitation in Saigon

For the Vietnamese people the end of bombing in the North has meant an intensified terror from the skies in the South. B-52s are employed like buckshot, spreading destruction over wide areas, often on the edge of the cities, wherever we think a few guerrillas may be hiding. Nobody but the victims have any conception of what this horror means. It is not strange that in Saigon, despite press control and the thousands imprisoned for peace agitation, the cry for a cease-fire has been rising, though little reported in the U. S. press. Both *Le Monde* (Jan 28-29) and *Le Figaro* (Jan. 29) report that elements which have hitherto strongly supported Thieu have joined the militant Buddhists in demanding a cease-fire. They quote Father Ca Van Lau, head of the Dan-Tien bloc in the Saigon Chamber of Deputies, as calling for a cease-fire now, as have two leaders of the Don Xa and the Grand Union Forces, organs respectively of the Hoa Hao sect and one faction of the Catholics. Both parties demonstrated last November in favor of Thieu. Now both parties have swung over to the Buddhist demand for an immediate cease-fire. In this, as in so much else, we are very poorly informed as to what ordinary Vietnamese think. To call for peace is still to risk jail in Saigon. The ungagged voice of popular sentiment may be better expressed in a manifesto issued in Paris (*Le Monde,* Jan. 30) of a Movement of the Free Forces of Vietnam, representing both civilian exiles and former Vietnamese officers who fought in the army organized by the French. It terms the present regime "nothing but a prolongation of the Fascist regime of Ngo Dinh Diem", which "governs by terror". It calls for its replacement by a provisional government which can negotiate in Paris with the Viet Cong and Hanoi.

This parallels the position taken by Hanoi and the NLF in the Paris peace talks. The NLF spokesman called for the formation of a broadly representative provisional government in Saigon which would organize "free general elections in South Vietnam" and be prepared to deal with the NLF in the Paris talks as an independent and equal party. (See texts in *Le Monde,* Jan. 28). "Although they speak of negotiations for peace," the NLF delegate to the Paris talks said, "the United States continues to intensify the war," and "still does not wish to renounce their aggressive aims in South Vietnam." We are paying heavily in American lives in an effort to impose the Saigon regime by force on the South Vietnamese. That is why the casualties rise as the peace talks go on.

A View From The Grass Roots

"This prosperous hamlet of orchard growers is one of 1,100 in the Vietnamese countryside earmarked for 'accelerated pacification' by early February, a scheme begun in November and described by one American pacification worker as 'the pre-cease fire land grab.' He was alluding to the official reasoning behind the new program: get control of as much land as possible before a cease-fire to diminish the Viet Cong's political influence locally and internationally.

"The Saigon government was claiming control over 68% of South Vietnam's 16,000,000 population in early November, statistics which credit the Viet Cong with control of fully or partially 32% of the population, or more than 5,000,000 people. 'This huge chunk of population would qualify the Viet Cong in the eyes of the world, to a big slice of government representation,' one U.S. official declared. It was therefore decided to try and whittle down the size of the Communist part of Vietnam and 'accelerated pacification' resulted."

—*AP from My Long, Vietnam,* Baltimore Sun *Jan. 19*

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